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In today’s global competitive environment, organizations face a variety of challenges. Continuous improvement in
organizational efficiencies and improving the entire supply chain are necessary to stay competitive. Many
organizations are adopting radio frequency identification technologies (RFID) as part of their information supply
chains. These technologies provide many benefits to the organizations that use them. However, how these
technologies affect the consumer and their willingness to adopt the technology is often overlooked.
Many of these RFID tags remain active after the consumers purchase them. These RFID tags, placed in a product
for one purpose and left in the product after the tags have served their purpose, are residual RFIDs. Residual RFID
technology can have many positive and negative effects on consumers’ willingness to buy and use products
containing RFID, and thus, on the business’s ability to sell products containing RFID. If consumers refuse to buy
products with residual RFID tags in them, the business harm is greater than the business benefit, regardless of any
gain in supply chain efficiency.
In this study, we outline some of the advantages and disadvantages of Residual RFID from the consumer
perspective, then follow up with an in depth survey and analysis of consumer perceptions. Using structural equation
modeling (SEM) we demonstrate that consumers’ perceptions of privacy risk likelihood and privacy risk harm
negatively impact their intentions to use this technology. The implications of these findings need to be considered
before the pending implementation of residual RFID technologies in the supply chain on a mass scale.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the near future, almost every new product available to consumers will have a small tag that can remotely and
uniquely identify that individual item. Any person or business with an appropriate scanner and information may
determine the item type, price, place of origin, place of purchase, and other details about a given product by reading
small radio frequency identification (RFID) tags. The current RFID market is approximately a $3 billion enterprise
with several million tags in circulation. That market is projected to grow by more than 800 percent, to over $25 billion
with tens of trillions of tags in circulation by 2015 [Wyld 2006].
Many organizations are currently deploying RFID tags in their supply chains. While these tags have the potential to
bring significant benefits to the organizations that use them, many of these tags remain in the product after they
leave the organization, their identities and histories readily available to anyone with a scanner and link to the proper
database. These left over tags, installed to help the supply chain, but not removed once they have lived out their
intended purpose, are Residual RFIDs.
The two different types of RFID tags, active and passive, offer their own differing benefits and liabilities to
consumers. A power source drives active RFID tags, making them capable of broadcasting their own signal over
varying distances, depending upon the potency of their power source and range of their frequency. While these tags
may be extremely useful in certain military and other applications, they offer only limited practicality for consumer
use, as the cost to produce such tags renders them impractical in a consumer environment.
Passive tags have no power source and are relatively inexpensive to produce. These economical tags are most
likely to be found in consumer goods. Lacking a power source, these tags are incapable of broadcasting their own
signal. This lack of broadcast ability initially sounds like a benefit in terms of consumer privacy, but the lack of a
power source makes these tags nearly immortal in consumer terms. They are activated only when scanned or read
by a RFID scanning device. Such activation may occur at a bus or train terminal, airport security checkpoint, retail
location, restaurant, or even as the result of a handheld scanner used unobtrusively at any time or place. These
passive tags, still present but no longer providing a realized retail benefit, are Residual RFID tags.
The adoption of RFID technologies is on the rise in many industries. Mandates by Wal-Mart, Target Corporation, and
Albertson’s in the United States, Metro Group in Germany, and Carrefour in France have pushed the use of RFID in
retailing. Governmental regulations on the traceability of food in the United States and Europe have pushed RFID
into food production. RFID is also being used in security systems, healthcare, livestock tracking, parcel and parts
tracking, casinos, U.S. toll roads (e.g. EZ-Pass), law enforcement, and the U.S. Department of Defense [Attaran
2006].
RFID technology is a part of our lives, whether we approve of the technology or not. Many of its applications have
very little effect on the average consumer (e.g., what can the consumer say about RFID in military applications for
the Department of Defense?), but the integration of this technology in other aspects of consumers’ lives raises
certain concerns.
The focus of most RFID research has been on the benefits that accrue to corporations and supply chains through
this technology. As such, many organizations have not adequately considered the impact of residual RFID
technology on consumers. The ultimate purpose of RFID technology is to provide retailers and suppliers, in time,
with the ability to track any item within the supply chain remotely and uniquely, at the individual level. The impact of
this ability, both positive and negative, on consumers will be enormous.
The threat to individual privacy that such technology raises is of particular concern. Consumers have called upon the
developers and users of RFID technology to implement precautions to limit the privacy risk issues. Others call upon
government to legislate the implementation and use of the technology. In March 2008, the governor of Washington
State signed into law a bill that declares the use of RFID technology to scan people’s IDs without their knowledge or
consent for fraudulent or other illegal purposes a class C felony [Gaudin 2008]. Such legislation may eventually
prove effective, but the question remains as to whether it will ultimately satisfy consumers to the degree that they
feel comfortable with the privacy risks associated with residual RFID.
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It is our suggestion that consumers’ perceptions of privacy risk associated with RFID technology, as well as their
perceptions of the technology’s overall usefulness, will directly influence their intentions to adopt or accept the
technology. We begin this paper with a discussion of prior research regarding RFID and its impact on consumers.
We specifically address consumer benefits and liabilities (usefulness), as well as the impact of privacy risk on
technology adoptions. We discuss the basis for our research, a desire to ascertain the perceptions and usage
intentions of individuals toward organizations and products that develop and/or employ residual RFID technology,
and the development of our hypotheses. We follow up with a discussion of our pilot studies and our data collection
method, consisting primarily of an in-depth survey of consumer perceptions regarding the potential wide-scale
adoption of RFID technologies. Finally, we present the results of our findings and evaluate the validity of our
hypotheses. We were unable to find any similar studies looking at privacy risk harm and likelihood related to
Residual RFID tags, indicating that this study makes an important new contribution to the literature.

II. THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Benefits of Residual RFID for Consumers
The benefits of RFID technology in business and governmental applications have been the focus of considerable
research, as have the security and privacy risks associated with the technology for consumers. The benefits of RFID
technology for consumers, however, are often overlooked. Yet it is imperative consumers understand that there are
legitimate consumer benefits associated with the use of this technology. Without realizable consumer benefit to
counteract the perceived risks associated with RFID, retailers will find it difficult to maintain a solid customer base in
the face of the perceived security and privacy risks.
RFID developers have sought to limit the perceived risk by trying to educate consumers as to the positive benefits of
RFID and by providing privacy policies to explain what data is being collected and how it is being used [Eckfeldt
2005]. It is a difficult task for retailers and RFID developers to limit the privacy risk for consumers. It is much easier
and more effective to improve the perceived value consumers receive through RFID by offering them better prices,
service, and/or experience [Eckfeldt 2005].
It has
ways:
1.
2.
3.

been suggested [Eckfeldt 2005] that RFID-based technologies provide value to consumers in three basic
peace of mind
consumer convenience
improved service

Since the purpose of RFID technology in the supply chain is to enhance the productivity and efficiency of the supply
chain, its usefulness, in theory, ends when the product to which a RFID tag is assigned leaves the supply chain and
enters the consumer domain. Residual RFIDs, those that have completed their jobs in the supply chain, may still
offer certain benefits for consumers beyond the retail experience. Examples of these benefits can be easily
evaluated under Eckfeldt’s headings.
Peace of Mind
Eckfeldt [2005] explains that the RFID applications with the greatest success in terms of adoption and proliferation
involve security. It is interesting to note that the very ability that has been the source of so much public outcry
against the technology—it’s potential ability to positively identify and track individuals—is also one of its greatest
consumer assets. This ability is what has caused RFID to find its way into security systems around the globe. The
perceived value here is that consumers know that only authorized people—persons for which they have at least an
element of trust—have access to the sensitive data collected by such systems. When tracking lacks any obvious
consumer security benefit and delivers only marketing information for retailers, the risk/reward equation does not
add up for consumers [Eckfeldt 2005].
Consumer Convenience
The EZ-Pass toll-collection system is a perfect example of successful RFID adoption by consumers [Eckfeldt 2005].
Consider the convenience benefit: a consumer has the choice to stop, roll down the car window, get out the money,
hand it to the toll collector, get the change and receipt, put it in the ashtray, roll up the window, and start driving
again; or this same consumer may simply approach the EZ-Pass entry point with the RFID-equipped pass on the
dash and drive right through with barely a reduction in speed. Despite the fact that the scanner in such systems
creates a precise time log and could potentially be used to map the consumer’s travels, the perceived convenience
benefit for daily commuters is likely to be greater than the perceived privacy risk such documentation poses.
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Residual RFIDs can also greatly simplify the process of returning retail goods. Products with embedded RFID tags
can potentially be returned without a receipt, and aid both the consumer and the retailer in streamlining customer
services. The future use of RFID may also include ease of checkout, in that consumers could purchase merchandise
by rolling shopping carts past point-of-sale terminals. These terminals would compute the total amount and perhaps
even charge RFID-enabled payment devices. Another possible application of RFID technology in customer
relationship management includes interactive objects [Juels 2005]. Consumers could interact with RFID-tagged
objects through their mobile phones, for example.
Improved Service
Certain high-end fashion retailers are beginning to use RFID-based systems to improve overall customer service
and the consumer shopping experience. Casinos, such as the Wynn Las Vegas resort, are using RFID to fight fraud
and provide guests with easy access to house credit. Delta Air Lines uses RFID tracking systems to ensure that
baggage arrives on time and at the appropriate destinations. The net result of all these solutions is a tangible
consumer benefit [Eckfeldt 2005]. Who can argue with a more pleasurable shopping experience, improved guest
treatment and security, or never having to deal with lost luggage again?
In other applications, insurance companies may be able to quickly log complete inventories of a person’s belongings
for home insurance purposes. Rather than relying on the lengthy and inadequate process of hand-written lists and
estimated replacement costs, agents might simply scan a home and catalog the results based upon the RFID tags
present in the home.

Liabilities of Residual RFID for Consumers
While consumers may realize legitimate benefits from residual RFID, the liabilities cannot be ignored. Spiekermann
and Ziekow [2005] suggest that five immediate and key threats of RFID technology are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Unauthorized assessment of one’s belongings by others
Tracking of persons via their objects
Retrieving social networks
Technology paternalism
Making people responsible for their objects

The most obvious violation is perhaps the first listed by Spiekermann and Ziekow [2005]. They suggest that “by
scanning inventories of flats and houses or baggage at airports promising targets for theft or burglary might be
identified” [Spiekermann and Ziekow 2005, p.3]. They also suggest that individuals may be tracked by others
through the objects they carry [Spiekermann and Ziekow 2005]. The offending party may be an individual,
organization, or government.
In addition, businesses could potentially target individuals with personalized advertising, both in-store and out, based
upon the objects they carry. While businesses may desire such efficiency in advertising, many consumers may view
such efforts as intrusive.
The identification and retrieving of social networks is another potential violation. Through the use of data mining
techniques, additional information can be gained from registered (RFID) tracks [Spiekermann and Ziekow 2005].
Analysing information about movement can be used to deduce social links between persons. While this may be of
potential interest for governmental agencies in the context of law enforcement [Spiekermann and Ziekow 2005],
there is also the potential for abuse and criminal intent.
Technology paternalism refers to a fear expressed in focus groups of uncontrolled autonomous action of machines
that cannot be overruled by object owners [Spiekermann and Ziekow 2005]. RFID fits into this idea quite well.
Spiekermann and Ziekow suggest that “RFID has the potential to overrule or punish people instantly for a myriad
minor incidents of misconduct and by this intrude heavily on peoples’ (lives)” [Spiekermann and Ziekow 2005, p. 8].
The scenario that people might be held responsible for objects they own or owned has frequently been cited in press
articles to criticize RFID-technology [Spiekermann and Ziekow 2005]. While in some respects this may be very
beneficial (objects used in the commission of a crime may be easily traced to their owners) it could also prove quite
intrusive (objects used in the commission of a crime may have been stolen).
These are only a few of the many potential liabilities that are currently being discussed regarding RFID technology.
As the technology gains more and more attention, additional concerns continue to be raised. The prevalence of
these concerns and the perceived risk to consumers these concerns generate have a direct effect on consumers’
willingness to purchase goods containing RFID technology.
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Potential Solutions
Recognizing that while RFID-based supply chains provide convenience, efficiency, and productivity gains for
businesses, Gao et al. [2004] point out that these systems also create new risks to security and privacy. The authors
suggest an approach that deals with randomized read access control in order to prevent hostile tracking and man-inthe-middle attack. RFID tags pose a potentially widespread threat to consumer privacy. The RFID tag uniquely
identifies each consumer product or item of merchandise and contains the manufacturer and product type as well,
creating a potential privacy problem. Many researchers such as Juels et al. [2003], Juels and Pappu [2003],
McCullaugh [2003], Sarma et al. [2002], Emigh [2004], Gao et al. [2004], Zhang and Li [2006], Karjoth and
Moskowitz [2005], and Markelevich and Bell [2006] have all raised the privacy issue.
Juels et al. [2003] propose the use of “selective blocking” by “blocker tags” as a way of protecting consumers from
unwanted scanning of RFID tags attached to items. The study conducted by Karjoth and Moskowitz [2005] focuses
on technical solutions for consumer privacy in retail. The researchers propose to provide RFID tag structures that
permit a consumer to disable a tag by mechanically altering the tag in such a way that inhibits the ability of a reader
to interrogate the RFID tag by wireless means. The authors refer to this procedure as “clipped tags,” where the body
or chip separates from the head or antenna. Clipped tags offer a simple and practical privacy-enhancing techniques
for RFID in retail, and deactivation can be performed in an easy, reliable, and verifiable way. The authors further
suggest that if deactivation of the tag is performed by the consumer, then no special devices are needed by retailers.

Impact of Privacy Risk on Technology Adoptions
Cazier et al. [2007] state that privacy risk factors are found to negatively influence consumer intentions. While theirs
was a study regarding e-commerce and privacy risk in a Web environment, the principle from our point of view
remains the same. If a consumer perceives a particular privacy or security risk as a result of residual RFID, that
perception could profoundly affect that consumer’s intention to purchase a particular product carrying a RFID tag or
engage in commerce with a retailer that uses RFID technology.
It has been stated that information technology is “morally neutral” in that it can be employed for both positive and
negative uses [Conca et al. 2005]. Some of these uses have already been explored in previous paragraphs, and
while there are legitimate benefits to the use of Residual RFID, the privacy risks are significant enough to warrant
consumer concern. This concern is not an unreasonable response. Privacy concerns rate among the highest of the
risks that Americans fear most [Garfinkel et al. 2002]. In fact, most Americans believe they are more likely to be a
victim of a cyber attack than a physical crime [IBM 2006].
Hoffman et al. [1999] showed that when users perceive an online environment to be risky, they are less likely to
purchase online. One of the greatest reasons for this type of consumer behavior is the fact that many consumers are
not fully aware of how their private data is being used and processed in an online environment [Raab and Bennett
1998]. Residual RFID, however, offers a completely new environment with which consumers are likely to be
unfamiliar. Organizations’ privacy practices regarding RFID may not be readily accessible, and even if they are,
simple consumer ignorance of the technology may cause significant numbers of consumers to be completely
unaware of how their purchasing habits and private information may be used by a given organization.
It should also be noted that when people perceive risks, they change their behaviors accordingly, often by
performing a risk benefit calculation that assists them in deciding whether they should or should not disclose private
information [Milne and Culnan 2004]. But in the case of RFID, that choice of whether to disclose or not disclose
information may not be available. Whether it is the retailer’s scanning of purchased goods or the illicit scanning by
would-be thieves, consumer purchases will be tracked, catalogued, and evaluated for further action.
In 2004, Ernst and Young conducted a survey of 1,000 Internet users on a variety of questions related to RFID
technology (Table 1). The results of that study showed that only 23 percent of surveyed consumers had heard of
RFID. Responses to the survey questions were quite favorable, at least until privacy issues were addressed [Juban
and Wyld 2004].
Note the change in response after privacy issues were introduced to the survey respondents. The results of the
survey showed that the greatest concerns to consumers regarding RFID technology were related to consumer
privacy and security [Juban and Wyld 2004]. Such results indicate that the risk of a privacy breach might have a
significant effect on consumers’ willingness to adopt RFID technology.
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Table 1. Ernst and Young Survey [Juban and Wyld 2004]
Survey Question

Initial
Response

After addressing
privacy issues

Would definitely buy RFID enabled products

55%

29%

Would be somewhat willing to buy RFID enabled products

28%

26%

Would definitely NOT buy RFID enabled products

17%

45%

Extending the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM)
We frame this paper as an extension of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw
1989]. TAM is a derivation of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) [Ajzen and Fishbein 1980], customized for the
prediction of IT adoption and use. TAM suggests that IT use can be predicted by its perceived usefulness (PU) and
perceived ease of use (PEOU), mediated by a subject’s behavioral intention (BI). All factors in the TAM equation,
except IT use, are therefore measured as one’s perceptions regarding one’s beliefs and intentions.
In practice, TAM has proven to be both powerful and parsimonious [Cazier et al. 2007]. Lee, Kozar, and Larsen
[2003], for example, report overwhelming support for the central relationships of TAM. Among the studies which
assessed each specific relationship, 88 percent find PU influences BI, 71 percent find PEOU influences BI, 84
percent find PEOU influences PU, and 87 percent find BI influences IT use. In addition, Lee et al. describe 25
external factors that have been studied as contributors to TAM, ranging from measures of voluntariness of use to
users’ prior experiences with the technology [Cazier et al. 2007]. None of the external factors described in their
study, however, addresses the security or privacy risks of technology use, which are of particular importance to
consumers considering the acceptance of RFID technology.
It is important to note that although attitude was included in the initial development of TAM, most subsequent studies
do not include an attitude measure [Lee et al., 2003], and one will not be considered here.
The formation of our hypotheses regarding consumer behavior is therefore based upon three mitigating factors:
1. The perceived usefulness and ease of use of RFID technology as it relates to consumers
2. The perceived likelihood of a consumer privacy breach occurring as a result of RFID technology use
3. The perceived harm such a privacy breach might incur
Why TAM?
TAM is a well-studied construct with a long history of use and application. This is one of the reasons why it makes
sense to use TAM in this type of research. The reason it has a long history with so many studies associated with it is
because it is a good model and provides useful predictive power in a variety of contexts. TAM therefore serves as a
useful baseline for comparison to prior work and helps us to build on a cumulative tradition as encouraged by some
of the earlier fathers of our discipline, such as Keen [1980].
This cumulative tradition and familiarity is especially important to this study because we are moving into a new
context with a different type of technology and audience. Most of the early TAM research was applied in the context
of a captive audience (i.e. employees) accepting an information system commissioned by the company they worked
for. Later researchers expanded this to shed light on some of the voluntary systems, such as e-commerce, that
provided intermittent use. However, this was a technology that consumers actively used.
We are now expanding this model again, to gauge consumer acceptance of a passive technology (residual RFID
tags) as opposed to an active technology, such as seeking out and searching a Web site. The expansion of this
technology to a passive context, accepting a tracking technology into our daily lives without necessarily seeking it
out, is an important new contribution to and from this model that helps establish a cumulative tradition and builds
upon what is useful while still learning something new from it.
In addition, by examining both positive and negative utility, the model we use in this paper builds upon TAM in a way
that goes beyond what most models have done in the past. Traditionally, TAM has explored numerous positive
aspects of things that could be done to increase the chances of users accepting an information system. However,
relatively few models have explored both positive and negative utility. Positive utility constructs discuss things that
can be done to help people accept and use a system. Negative utility looks at elements in a system, the risks
involved in their use, and how these elements affect people’s acceptance and use of a system. This is especially
important as many people are beginning to abandon completing tasks online that they once performed due to the
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risks involved in those transactions, such as the 18 percent of Americans who indicated they stopped banking online
due to this anxiety [IBM 2006]. This exploration of negative utility with TAM provides new insight while building upon
prior work.
The use of TAM in this context makes a significant and innovative contribution by looking at both positive and
negative utility, allowing us to weight the relative importance of each, and by expanding a proven model to a passive
as opposed to active user context. Even though it is an old and familiar tool, TAM can, in some cases, still provide
new insight and value, as in this context.

Perceived Privacy Risk
Heijden et al. [2003] determined that “perceived risk” directly influences an individual’s attitude toward making online
purchases. In fact, according to their study, the effect of risk on attitude toward online purchasing is an order of
magnitude greater than the effects of both perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness. The “perceived risk”
referred to in their research, however, is of a more general nature than the privacy risk we propose in this paper. Our
research makes a significant contribution by focusing on privacy risk, particularly as it pertains to the acceptance of
RFID technologies.
Our research further supports the premise of TAM and expands it to include perceived privacy risk. Our model of
privacy risk follows the suggestion of Kim and Leem [2005] that risk involves two elements: 1) the probability of an
event occurring; and 2) a loss amount. Our model follows the suggestion of Cazier et al. [2007], that the two
elements that comprise consumer privacy risk are perceived privacy risk likelihood (the probability of an event
occurring) and perceived privacy risk harm (the amount of loss a consumer might sustain from such an occurrence).
Risk is then calculated as the probability of an event occurring multiplied by the loss or amount of harm that could be
done if that loss is realized [Straub and Welke 1998]. These elements, in conjunction with TAM, will directly influence
consumer behavior regarding RFID acceptance and use.
Featherman and Pavlou [2003] also draw upon the theory of perceived risk, defining privacy risk as the “potential
loss of control over personal information.” Their study identifies the importance of expanding TAM by looking at
negative utility factors to produce more in-depth results. The inclusion of negative utility factors in the model can
provide a more realistic and complete picture of technology acceptance [Cazier et al. 2007]. Perceived privacy risk,
as it pertains to our study, is a negative utility factor, and is therefore an important contribution to existing literature.
Perceived Privacy Risk Likelihood
Drennan et al. [2006] state that perception of risk is fundamental to the understanding of consumer concerns about
privacy and the relationship that exists among the factors of privacy, risk, and behavioral intentions. While their study
focused on consumer behavior in an e-commerce environment, we contend that the same analysis applies to
consumers and their behavior concerning RFID technologies.
Risk likelihood is the perception of the probability that a privacy breach will occur [Cazier et al., 2007]. Most people,
upon perceiving that an action they are about to take involves a certain amount of risk, subsequently reevaluate the
decision to carry on with the intended action. This applies to consumer purchasing as well. Most consumers
evaluate the probability of risk to their privacy every time they engage in an online transaction. Certain factors, such
as an organization’s security policy or encryption standards, may influence the consumer’s decision regarding
whether to engage in a business transaction with that organization.
Perceived Privacy Risk Harm
Risk harm is the perception of the level of damage that would occur in the event of a privacy breach [Cazier et al.
2007]. When determining consumer behavior, the potential for harm must be factored alongside the potential of a
privacy breach occuring. For one consumer, the potential harm that may occur in the event of a privacy breach may
be relatively small, and therefore a minimal factor in that person’s intent to purchase, but for another consumer, the
potential harm may be very great, significant enough to be a deterring factor in that person’s intent to purchase.

Hypotheses
Based upon the factors discussed in this section, we have composed five hypotheses that we will test through a
survey instrument designed to assess the perceptions and usage intentions of individuals toward organizations and
products that employ residual RFID technology.
H1: Perceived ease of use will have a positive impact on the perceived usefulness of RFID technology.
We propose that the perceived ease of use of RFID systems in association with consumer benefits will have a
positive effect on consumers’ perceptions of the usefulness of Residual RFID (Figure 1). Technology that is easy to
Volume 23

Article 14

241

use is more likely to be used and to be percieved as useful as people can better visualize how it will be used in their
daily lives to fill a need. This has been one of the founding components of technology acceptance since the
inception of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). For consumers, who have a choice to purchase and use a
product, as opposed to those in a corporate setting who are mandated to use it, ease of use may be even more
important than in some of the early TAM research with mandated use, or less recreational use that was required for
their job function.

Figure 1: Model for H1
H2: Perceived usefulness will have a positive impact on intention to use products with RFID tags.
TAM also proposes that perceptions of the usefulness of Residual RFID will have a positive impact on consumers’
intentions to accept the technology (Figure 2). If a technology is perceived to be useful, aiding consumers with tasks
they must perform, they are more likely to want to use this technology. This link is also a hallmark of TAM included in
the original Davis et al. [1989] study.

Figure 2: Model for H2
H3: Perceived ease of use will have a positive impact on intention to use products with RFID technology.
Likewise, we propose that the perceived ease of use of RFID systems in association with consumer benefits will
have a positive impact on consumers’ intentions to accept the technology (Figure 3). The more difficult a given
technology is to use, the higher the level of cognitive or other effort is required. As effort level increases, consumer
intentions to use the product drop as the expected benefit per unit of effort drops, making the effort/benefit payout
less attractive.

Figure 3: Model for H3
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H4: Consumer perceptions of the potential for harm due to privacy risk will have a negative impact on their intentions
to accept residual RFID technology.
Risk is the probability of an event occurring multiplied by the loss or amount of harm that could occur if that loss is
realized [Straub and Welke 1998]. Our conceptualization of privacy risk follows the suggestion of Kim and Leem
[2005] that risk involves two elements: the probability of an event occurring, which we denote as perceived privacy
risk likelihood, and a loss amount, which we denote as perceived privacy risk harm. Risk likelihood is the perception
of probability that a privacy breach will occur. Risk harm is the perception of the level of damage that would occur in
event of a privacy breach [Cazier et al. 2007].
Consumers’ perceptions of privacy risk in regards to the potential for harm will have a negative impact on their
intentions to accept Residual RFID technology (Figure 4). A number of researchers have studied monetary risks in
online computing associated with e-commerce. Hoffman et al. [1999] find that when users perceived the online
environment to be risky, they are less likely to purchase online. Labuschagne and Eloff write, “The major reason
most people are still skeptical about electronic commerce is the perceived security risks associated with electronic
transaction over the internet” [2000, pg 154]. Heijdenet al. [2003] found that the trust antecedent “perceived risk”
directly influences an individual’s attitude toward making online purchases.

Figure 4: Model for H4
H5: Consumer perceptions of the likelihood of a privacy breach occurring will have a negative impact on their
intentions to accept residual RFID technology.
We propose that perceptions of privacy risk in regards to the likelihood of a privacy breach occurring will have a
negative impact on consumers’ intentions to accept Residual RFID technology. The greater the probability of a
negative privacy event occuring, according to consumer perception, the more reluctant consumers will be to accept
this technology. Risk beliefs were found to have a very significant and direct impact on behavioral intentions
[Malhotra et al. 2004], similar to those presented in our model (Figure 5).

Volume 23

Article 14

243

Figure 5: Model for H5
Hypotheses Summary
Our research model augments TAM with risk likelihood and risk harm (see Figure 1). Based on predominating
findings in the TAM literature, we anticipate PEOU will have a positive effect on both PU and BI toward IT use, and
we anticipate PU will have a positive effect on BI. We propose that perception of privacy risk will influence decisions
toward RFID use. We anticipate BI toward RFID use will diminish where the perception of privacy risk is high and
increase where the perception is low. In the present study, we operationalize privacy risk through its two elemental
components, risk harm (RH) and risk likelihood (RL). We hypothesize that both factors will negatively influence BI
(Figure 6).

Figure 6: Model for All Hypotheses Combined

244

Volume 23

Article 14

III. METHODOLOGY
We conducted the research methodology using a survey instrument that assessed the perceptions and usage
intentions of individuals toward organizations and products that develop and/or employ residual RFID technology.
While there has been some popular press about residual RFID technologies, such as the report by Abramson [2004]
on National Public Radio (NPR), the implications of Residual RFID may not have fully entered the consciousness of
the average consumer. Since mass adoption of these technologies is imminent, it is important to understand how
consumers do and will react to mass Residual RFID adoption. Therefore, we presented a brief education piece to
each subject prior to completing the survey, instructing subjects regarding the fundamental principles of Residual
RFID technology. This survey introduction may be found at the start of Appendix A.
In the interest of research accuracy and applicability, we selected questions for the survey instrument from
previously validated instruments where possible, adapting them to meet the criteria of our survey. In addition, we
conducted two separate pilot studies in an effort to further validate and refine the selected questions before
conducting the final survey and compiling the results.

Pilot Study
We first used an online version for a pilot study with a student sample. However, we were concerned about the
generalilizability of this sample due to our student demographics and particularly their familiarity with technology
compared to other consumers, especially older, less-educated consumers that might be more of the typical Wal-Mart
shopper (a company heavily pushing this technology).
To reach this audience, we developed a paper-based version of our instrument to try to capture this other
demographic and allow those without easy computer access to respond. We accomplished this through a
convenience sample where volunteers asked likely consumers of future products containing RFID to complete the
survey from a variety of settings, and offered a prize through a drawing for one of the respondents. This method had
the advantage of collecting a large sample of people of all demographics. However, this format does not give a
traditional response rate that one might expect with a mail-in survey.
Our sample consisted of 320 likely consumers of products with embedded residual RFID tags. All respondents were
residents of the United States. Approximately 53 percent of the subjects were female, 47 percent male. While the
mean age, collected in categories, was just under 30 years of age, we had a wide range of age groups from under
20 to over 70. Approximately 13 percent of the respondents were under 20, 57 percent of them were between 20
and 29, 3 percent were between 30 and 39, 12 percent were between 40 and 49, 11 percent were between 50 and
59, and 5 percent were over 60 years of age. Additionally, approximately 43 percent of the respondents’ income was
under $20,000, 12 percent earned between $20,000 and $39,999, 15% earned between $40,000 and $59,999, 7
percent earned between $60,000 and $79,999, 7 percent earned between $80,000 and $99,999, 4 percent earned
between $100,000 and $119,999, and 12 percent earned $120,000 or greater.
The profession of the respondents included administrative assistant, accountant, healthcare, engineering, marketing
and sales, management, manufacturing, computer and IT, graphic arts, entrepreneurship, academic, real estate,
financial and banking, ministry, hospitality, and retired. Respondents’ familiarity with RFID technologies provided
interesting results. Approximately 29 percent of the respondents had absolutely no knowledge of the RFID
technologies, 14 percent were very unfamiliar with these technologies, 16 percent were somewhat unfamiliar with
these technologies, 7 percent had a neutral opinion of these technologies, 27 percent were somewhat familiar with
these technologies, and 7 percent were very familiar with these technologies. None of the respondents claimed to be
an expert with RFID technologies.

Scale Validation and Reliability
We constructed our final, paper-based survey instrument using questions from several validated existing surveys.
We modified questions where necessary to coincide with the nature of residual RFID technology and refined them
through two separate pilot studies. (See appendix A for a copy of the survey instrument.) Nearly all items in the
survey are measured on a 7-point Likert scale, with endpoints labeled “Very Strongly Disagree” / “Almost
Impossible” / “No Harm At All” (Value =1) and “Very Strongly Agree” / “Almost Certain” / “Severe Harm” (Value = 7)
as dictated by the form in which the item is stated. We stored all data collected during the study in a secure
database for later statistical analysis.
With all factors loading, the constructs cleanly load on five separate factors, as shown in Table 2. We selected the
strongest three of the five questions in each construct to represent each factor. As shown in Table 2, all Cronbach
Alpha values are .8 or higher, factor loadings are routinely near .8 as well. This analysis demonstrates that there are
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five clear factors, all of which load cleanly on the latent constructs we are attempting to measure. 1 Results were
analyzed using Lisrel version 8.2 for structural equation modeling.
Table 2. Rotated Factor Matrix

Description

PU

PU1

Using RFID technology will improve the
quality of my shopping experience.

4.24

1.10

.003

-.116

.279

.254

.825

α = .83 PU2

RFID technology will improve the efficiency
of my shopping experience.

4.29

1.11

.027

.005

.169

.282

.866

PU3

The widespread adoption of this technology
will ultimately lead to lower prices.

3.88

1.20

-.127

.029

.311

.088

.689

PEOU1

Residual RFID will make returning purchases
easier.

4.85

.96

.107

.045

.027

.860

.150

α = .81 PEOU2

Tracking stolen products will be made easier
through Residual RFID.

5.00

.96

.154

.033

.138

.865

.103

PEOU3

Residual RFID will make filing insurance
claims easier.

4.58

.99

.001

.001

.095

.727

.310

RL1

How likely is it that someone will use
Residual RFID to steal your personal
information?

4.92

1.15

.309

.865

-.129

.116

.006

α = .94 RL2

How likely is it that your personal information
will be stolen as a result of Residual RFID?

4.73

1.12

.257

.903

-.158

.000

.000

RL3

How likely is it that your privacy will be
violated as a result of Residual RFID?

4.86

1.15

.236

.888

-.221

.001

.003

RH1

How much harm could be done to you if
someone broke into RFID databases
containing your private personal information?

5.53

1.13

.913

.227

-.106

.048

.003

α = .92 RH2

How much harm could be done to you if an
organization that employs RFID abused your
information?

5.53

1.13

.886

.287

.007

.049

.009

RH3

How much harm could be done if consumers’
personal information is stolen because of
RFID?

5.67

1.20

.859

.238

-.103

.135

.004

BI1

I would prefer to purchase products from
retailers that use RFID.

3.87

1.19

.007

-.212

.737

.213

.299

α = .85 BI2

I would actively seek out products that use
RFID.

3.48

1.21

-.160

-.124

.854

.006

.246

BI3

If given the choice between a RFID product
and a non-RFID product, I would choose the
product that uses RFID.

3.66

1.19

-.123

-.195

.843

.101

.214

PEOU

RL

RH

BI

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Factor Loadings*

Factor/
Items
Alpha

1

2

3

4

5

IV. RESULTS
Enabled Residual Tags
The results of this research study support TAM on all three constructs: 1) perceived ease of use has a reasonable
impact on perceived usefulness; 2) perceived ease of use has a reasonable impact on behavioral intentions; and 3)
1
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Conducted using unconstrained maximum likelihood extraction and varimax rotation.
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perceived usefulness has a reasonable impact on behavioral intentions. In addition, and most noteworthy, our
modified TAM constructs are supported as well. Privacy risk likelihood has a significant and negative impact on
behavioral intentions, close in significance to the impact of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use,
validating the importance of this construct. Likewise, privacy risk harm also has a significant negative impact on
behavioral intention. This validates our five hypotheses, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Hypotheses Summary for Enabled Tags
Hypothesis

Effect –
Enabled Tags

Description

Supported

H1

PEOU will have a positive impact on PU.

0.57

Yes

H2

PU will have a positive impact on BI.

0.59

Yes

H3

PEOU will have a positive impact on BI.

0.38

Yes

H4

RL will have a negative impact on BI.

-0.46

Yes

H5

RH will have a negative impact on BI.

-0.15

Yes

Table 4 and Figure 7 present the path coefficients and the strength of the path for each hypothesis. The data
support all paths at the .05 significance level, supporting our hypothesis. Likewise, the overall fit of the model,
described in table 4, supports the complete model. Most fit indices are in the .90 or higher range as recommend by
Kelloway [1998] with the RMSEA below .10, also recommended by Kelloway [1998]. The overall model therefore
has a good fit.

Figure 7: Privacy Risk Model
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Table 4. Fit Statistics for Enabled Tag Model
Fit Statistics –
Active Tags

Fit Measure

Abbreviation

Chi-square

χ2

310.78

Degrees of freedom

Df

85.00

2

0.65

Goodness of fit index

χ /df
GFI

Normed fit index

NFI

0.91

Relative fit index

RFI

0.89

Incremental fit index

IFI

0.93

Comparative fit index

CFI

0.93

Root mean square error of approximation

RMSEA

Root mean square residual

RMR

Adjusted Goodness of fit index

AGFI

Discrepancy/df

Squared multiple correlations for PU
Squared multiple correlations for BI

0.89

0.087
0.20
0.85

SMC/R

2

0.52

SMC/R

2

0.28

Disabled RFID Tag Results
Rather than measure only the negative impact of privacy risk on consumers’ behavioral intentions, we wanted to
learn whether there was anything companies could do, from a consumer perspective, to mitigate privacy risk
likelihood and harm. In addition to our questions designed to ascertain consumer behavior, we asked our subjects
the following questions to determine whether their behavior would change under the circumstances presented:
1. I would be more inclined to purchase products that use RFID if I could disable the RFID tag after my
purchase. (BI1 in this model)
2. I would be more inclined to purchase products that use RFID if the retailer would automatically disable the
RFID tag after my purchase. (BI2 in this model)
We then ran the model using these two elements, using the same scale validation, and determined that when the
consumer has the ability to disable the tags, as indicated by the two scenarios presented above, privacy risk
likelihood and privacy risk harm become non-significant in the model, as shown in Figure 8, while TAM remains
strong and significant.
The inclusion of this second scenario, as shown in Figure 8, is important as it renders our fourth and fifth hypotheses
unsupported (see Table 5). Deactivated tags result in no verifiable perceived privacy risk likelihood and therefore no
verifiable perceived privacy risk harm. Organizations should carefully consider these findings before adopting a SCM
that includes Residual RFID technology.
Table 5. Hypotheses Summary for Disabled Tag Model
Hypothesis
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Effect – Active
Effect –
Supported
Supported
Tags
Disabled Tags

Description

H1

PEOU will have a positive impact on PU.

0.57

Yes

0.52

Yes

H2

PU will have a positive impact on BI.

0.59

Yes

0.27

Yes

H3

PEOU will have a positive impact on BI.

0.38

Yes

0.53

Yes

H4

RL will have a negative impact on BI.

-0.46

Yes

-0.05

No

H5

RH will have a negative impact on BI.

-0.15

Yes

-0.11

No
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Figure 8: Privacy Risk Model, Disabled RFID Tags
Table 6 displays the fit statistics for this model and shows a good overall fit.
Table 6. Fit Statistics for Disabled Tag Model
Fit Statistics –
Disabled Tags

Fit Measure

Abbreviation

Chi-square

χ2

251.850

Degrees of freedom

Df

72.000

2

Goodness of fit index

χ /df
GFI

0.900

Normed fit index

NFI

0.920

Relative fit index

RFI

0.900

Incremental fit index

IFI

0.940

Comparative fit index

CFI

0.940

Root mean square error of approximation

RMSEA

0.089

Root mean square residual

RMR

0.21

Adjusted Goodness of fit index

AGFI

0.85

Squared multiple correlations for PU

SMC/R2

0.34

Squared multiple correlations for BI

SMC/R2

0.23

Discrepancy/df

0.570
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It should be noted, however, that disabling the tag automatically removes any benefits companies and consumers
might receive from Residual RFID tags and may raise either tag or item costs. While disabling the tags may remove
the problem, it does so by making them non-residual and at a cost of the benefits of residual tags.

V. DISCUSSION
Consumers’ perceptions of privacy risk associated with RFID technology, as well as their perceptions of its
usefulness and ease of use, directly influence their intention to adopt and accept this technology. The technology
acceptance model (TAM) as fully supported in the complete model with enabled tags, with every hypothesis having
significant support. Notably, perceived ease of use (PEOU) has a positive and direct impact on perceived usefulness
(PU) and intention to use (BI); PU has a positive impact on BI while perceived privacy risk likelihood (RL) and
perceived privacy risk harm (RH) have direct and negative impacts on BI. All of these constructs are important in
understanding the behavioral intentions of consumers. Predictably, when we disable the tags (take away the
technology) in model 2, RH and RL become insignificant, but PEOU and PU remain strong predictors of BI. This
shows that privacy risk harm and privacy risk likelihood are especially important when dealing with Residual RFID,
as opposed to disabled tags. However, since the residual tags have the most to offer business, consumers and
society, it would be well if we could find a way to address these privacy risks.
This paper makes an important point by expanding TAM to a new domain, that of residual RFID tags, that looks at
passive technology adoptions with both positive and negative utility. The fit indices, factor analysis and findings are
very strong, showing a strong and resilient model for this technology. TAM is our most studied theoretical framework
in information systems [Premkumar and Bhattacherjee 2008] and is an important part of building upon a cumulative
tradition in our discipline.
Even though TAM is our most studied construct, it still requires significant investigation to fully understand and use it
in our changing business and technological environments. For example, Lai and Li [2005] assert that even though
TAM is a mature model and has been validated in different contexts, it still must be empirically investigated for its
invariance across different respondent subgroups in order to make sure that different sample profiles would not have
a negative effect on the findings. Unfortunately, this has not happened in most TAM research.
This suggests that while we are developing a cumulative tradition, especially as it relates to TAM, that tradition still
requires much investigation to finish this process. Additionally, it is arguably even more important in a field such as
information systems, that seems to be changing much faster than other disciplines, to build and maintain this
cumulative tradition as people and technologies evolve. What was true yesterday may be more nuanced today as
new generations of people emerge with different interactions with technology and technology has more to offer than
in the past. Thus, looking at TAM in a new context can still make an important contribution to our IS literature,
especially as it foreshadows a wave of new technology being rolled out that will have a significant impact on
consumers, that of residual RFID.
Residual RFID is an important part of cultivating and securing the information supply chain that takes place after the
technology reaches the consumer. With mass adoption of Residual RFID technologies imminent, we can no longer
leave the consumer out of the supply chain. These technologies, used in the supply chain and left over, can now
have a significant impact on consumers’ acceptance and purchase of products with embedded Residual RFID
technologies. Specifically, consumers’ perceptions of privacy risk likelihood and privacy risk harm have a significant
negative impact on consumers’ willingness to adopt products that use these technologies. Therefore, companies
must extend the mental conception of their supply chains to the consumer, and consider how the consumer will
accept and interact with a product before implementing full-scale mass deployment of these technologies.
Otherwise, consumer backlash may become a significant issue.
This research shows that positive and negative utility are both important to consumers when considering the
adoption and acceptance of residual RFID tags, and that both risk likelihood and risk harm are strong and important
deterrents to consumer acceptance of this technology. While many businesses focus on the positive impact of the
technology and how it will benefit them, they would be wise to remember that ultimately the consumer must accept
this technology, and right now, many have unaddressed concerns that may prohibit such acceptance. Perceptions of
risk likelihood are an especially strong deterrent to this consumer acceptance and businesses must address such
deterrents if they want consumers to embrace this technology.
While it is useful and important for businesses to focus on positive utility factors such as perceived ease of use and
perceived usefulness, it is also essential that they not forget about negative utility factors, such as privacy risk
likelihood and privacy risk harm, that have the potential to lead consumers to a possible rejection of products
containing RFID technologies. Notably, when we give consumers the choice to disable Residual RFID tags, either
on their own or automatically at the time of purchase, the problem of negative utility becomes insignificant. This,
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however, may be an undesirable course of action, as through the disabling of the tags, businesses and consumers
not only lose the negative reaction, but they also sacrifice the benefits that this technology can bring to businesses
as well as to consumers. Disabling the tags essentially takes away their residual nature.
Due to the nature of RFID technology, and especially the residual aspects of it that allow it to remain active
indefinitely, it is likely beyond the ability of businesses alone to adequately address these concerns while still reaping
the positive aspects of the technology. The easiest way for businesses to reduce the fear is by disabling the tags,
which makes the concerns about risk harm and risk likelihood insignificant. However, this very act is essentially
making the concern go away by not using the technology. By not using the technology, businesses are giving up all
of the positive benefits that could accrue to society now and in the future by having residual tags to help with the
after market supply chain activities. This does reduce the concerns, but this would be like throwing the baby out with
the bath water.
One such benefit that would be lost with disabling the tags is that of having a greener after market supply chain. By
not disabling the tags, businesses, governments and consumer groups could use this technology to trace the life
history of a product through its use and disposal, making it easier and more efficient to recycle goods. As concern
for the environment grows, this could be a potentially untapped benefit for consumer recycling of goods and reverse
logistics. Business groups might be able to tout this and other potential benefits to government officials as a way to
address the real problems of reducing the risk harm and risk likelihood perceptions of consumers in a manner that
still preserves the benefits.
Breaking risk out into risk likelihood and risk harm, as we do in this study, is very important in helping us understand
this process. Doing so gives us the ability to look at these constructs independently so that organizations may
address each construct independently. For example, organizations may look at the relative impact strength of risk
likelihood versus risk harm and spend considerable time, effort, and money reinforcing and improving security
measures to reduce the perception of a breach occurring. Organizations and governments might also use this
strategy to focus on reducing the amount of harm that may occur by enacting ID theft laws that limit consumer
liability and may increase consumers’ intentions to accept RFID technology.
Because of the innovative nature of this research, presented here in advance of a significant shift in information
supply chains, it is challenging for consumers to realistically comprehend the full-scale implications of moving toward
a world where Residual RFID tags are everywhere, present in every consumer product. Consequently, while this
research is important in understanding how consumers react when presented with likely scenarios, reactions may
change as consumer understanding matures in this area.

Future Research
Future research should expand upon this model by exploring how to mitigate privacy risk likelihood and privacy risk
harm perceptions through organizational and educational practices as well as governmental intervention. In addition,
it might be useful for future researchers to integrate trust into the model to determine whether trust can be a
mitigating factor for privacy risk. Additionally, it would be interesting to study the shifts in consumers’ views over time
across generation. This will be especially interesting when consumers become more aware of the RFID technology
and the impact on their world. The current study makes an important contribution by setting a baseline of their views
today that would be useful for future comparisons as the world changes.
In this increasingly flat world it will be useful to reexamine this research in an international context and in various
settings, such as health care, consumer purchases, high and low end products, etc. Consumers may react
differently to residual RFID use in health care as opposed to retail. Therefore, we recommend study within different
contexts. It may also be worth studying the impact of government use of RFID, such as the current plan to embed
RFID tags in U.S. passports.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY INTRODUCTION AND QUESTIONS
Many experts predict that in the future, nearly every product manufactured, bought and/or sold will have a tiny tag
that can remotely and uniquely identify that individual item. Any person or business with a scanner may be able to
know the item type, price, where it was made, sold, purchased and resold by reading a small RFID tag.
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are currently being deployed in the supply chains of many organizations.
These tags have the potential to bring many benefits to organizations that use them. However, many of these tags
can remain active after they leave the organization, broadcasting their identities and histories to anyone with a
scanner and link to the proper database. These left over tags, installed to help the supply chain, but not removed
after the purchase, are referred to as Residual RFIDS.
In the future, Residual RFID tags have a tremendous amount of potential to both help and harm consumers. A few
examples are listed below.
Possible Benefits
•
•
•

Residual RFID tags may make it possible to return items without a receipt.
Residual RFID tags may make it easier to track and find stolen goods.
Residual RFID tags may make it easier to track and fulfill warranties and repairs.

Possible Liabilities
•
•
•

Companies could scan for Residual RFID tags in order to target marketing to individuals.
Thieves could scan for Residual RFID tags in order to case out potential victims.
Residual RFID tags could give out a tremendous amount of private information about individuals.

The first six questions of the survey are demographics questions, and as such, are not represented here. Questions
7 – 35 (except question 12, which is open-ended) are measured on a 7-point Likert scale, from Very Strongly
Disagree (Value = 1) to Very Strongly Agree (Value = 7).
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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Residual RFID will make returning purchases easier.
Residual RFID will make returning purchases more efficient.
Residual RFID will make it easier for authorities to track stolen products.
Residual RFID will make filing insurance claims easier and more accurate.
Residual RFID will enable retailers to better serve me by helping them better understand my purchase
preferences.
Please list other ways you can think of in which RFID might affect consumers. (Open ended)
Residual RFID will ultimately be used for my best interests.
Organizations that develop RFID technology will be careful to ensure that my privacy is protected.
Companies that employ RFID in their products will do what is best for me.
Companies that employ RFID in their products will do what is best for society.
The government will make every effort to protect my privacy from RFID abuse.
Organizations that use RFID will fulfill their promises.
Organizations that use RFID are honest.
Organizations behind RFID deployment have integrity.
Organizations that use RFID will tell the truth about its risks.
The government will tell the truth about the risks I may encounter with RFID.
Overall, I trust the organizations behind RFID technology.
Overall, I trust the organizations that use RFID.
Overall, organizations that use RFID technology are worthy of receiving consumer trust.
I trust the government not to abuse RFID technology.
I trust the government to protect me from RFID abuse.
I would prefer to purchase products from retailers that use RFID.
The use of RFID is unlikely to change my purchasing preferences.
I would actively seek out products that use RFID.
If given the choice between a RFID product and a non-RFID product, I would choose the product that uses
RFID.
I would be more inclined to purchase products that use RFID if I could disable the RFID tag after my
purchase.
I would be more inclined to purchase products that use RFID if the retailer would automatically disable the
RFID tag after my purchase.
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34. The greater ease with which products may be returned would encourage me to purchase products that use
RFID.
35. I would be willing to pay extra to disable RFID tags in the products I purchase.
Questions 36 – 37 are measured on a 7-point Likert scale, from –10% (Value = 1) to +10% (Value = 7).
36. How much more or less would you expect to pay for products that use RFID?
37. How much more or less would you be willing to pay for products that use RFID?
Questions 38 – 42 are measured on a 7-point Likert scale, from Almost Impossible (Value = 1) to Almost Certain
(Value = 7).
38. How likely is it that residual RFID would enable others to use your private personal information in a way you
would not approve of?
39. How likely is it that others would use residual RFID to abuse some of your personal information?
40. How likely is it that someone will use residual RFID to steal your personal information?
41. How likely is it that your private personal information will be stolen as a result of residual RFID?
42. How likely is it that your privacy will be violated as a result of residual RFID?
Questions 43 – 47 are measured on a 7-point Likert scale, from No Harm At All (Value = 1) to Severe Harm (Value =
7).
43. How much harm could be done to you if someone broke into RFID databases containing your private
personal information?
44. How much harm could be done to you if an organization that employs RFID abused your information?
45. How much harm could be done if consumers’ personal information is abused through RFID?
46. How much harm could be done if consumers’ personal information is stolen because of RFID?
47. How much harm could be done to you if someone used residual RFIDs to track your purchases and/or
personal possessions?
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